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Abstract 
In economic models of dynamic choice under uncertainty, the "Information Value" is the 
highest price an individual is willing to pay for information. This amount usually increases as 
information becomes more specific. Applying experimental economics an experimental game 
has been constructed in which individuals choose between alternative congested transport 
modes to try to arrive at a destination at a specified time. To reduce the risk associated with 
modal choice, each subject can buy information about traffic levels. Two information 
messages are offered one after the other, the second giving more information. The results 
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show the value individuals ascribe to information in a context of increasing information where 
information is not free, and the price of information price and infrastructure capacities vary. 
Individuals compare the utility of information to its cost and this calculation is an important 
part of the comparison between risk with regard to travel time and the monetary travel cost. 
Moreover, individuals choose to buy information when the variance of payoffs for the chosen 
route is sufficiently high. The paper shows that the economic model of dynamic choice seems 
to provide a reasonable approximation of individual values. In particular, the willingness to 
pay for more detailed information is higher than for more general information. Finally, it 
shows how an experimental economics technique can produce empirical data to test 
theoretical models dealing with transport behavior. 
 
JEL: C91; D83; R41 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The provision of real-time road traffic information is an important part of present-day 
transport policy (Emmerink et al., 1995; Mahmassani and Chang, 1985; Mahmassani and 
Jayakrishnan, 1991; Mahmassani and Tong, 1986). Given the growing congestion on urban 
and interurban roads and the difficulties in financing new facilities, better information 
technology may improve traffic flow, particularly as it has even been demonstrated that 
information provision has the potential to reduce excess travel time (Ben-Akiva, de Palma and 
Kaysi, 1991). 
However, there have been few analytical studies of individual transport choice with changing 
levels of traffic information. Some of these studies have aimed to assess the welfare impact of 
increased knowledge about traffic (Arnott et al., 1991, 1996, 1999; Emmerink et al., 1998). 
Such of the models are based on rational expectations and study the impact on choice of three 
types of information (no information, imperfect and perfect information). Obviously, 
improved information increases consumer surplus, but the welfare benefit could be reduced in 
some cases by increased congestion, especially when there are too many informed drivers or 
when drivers overreact to the information they receive (Delvert, Denant-Boèmont and Petiot, 
2000; Emmerink et al., 1995). Note that in most of these models, information is free at all 
times. Furthermore individual choices are stochastic but remain static (except in Arnott et al. 
1999) - i.e. once users have made their travel choice (which they may do in several stages) no 
more information about traffic is available for them to learn and to modify their choice. Such 
a model is implemented in this paper. 
This paper builds an analytical model of Information Value (IV) for transport choice where 
decision-making is dynamic and information is not free. How do road users make use of new 
information about traffic levels when congestion is likely to occur on the available routes? 
How do they change their transport plans when they receive additional information? 
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An experimental economics method (Davis and Holt, 1993) has been used to test the 
behavioral responses of players in a transport situation. It is important to distinguish between 
the usual methods used to assess user preference – i.e. revealed and stated preference 
techniques - and experimental economics. As Friedman and Sunder (1994) have pointed out, 
the important fact is that economic experimenters try to produce laboratory experimental data, 
which implies a high level of control of experimental conditions and players’ incentives by 
making payments to players which depend on their choices. There have still only been a few 
experimental economics studies of transport decision-making (Delvert and Petiot, 1999; 
Delvert, Denant-Boèmont and Petiot, 2000; Schneider and Weimann, 1997). To the best of 
our knowledge, this study is the first to implement a method of this type for dynamic choice1 
in the area of transport when individuals are faced with uncertainty about traffic. In the field 
of transport, experimental economics has only been implemented to test market efficiency 
(Grether, Issac and Plott, 1989 who dealt with air transport deregulation; Brewer and Plott, 
1994, or Nilsson, 1997 who dealt with railway deregulation; Fischer et al., 1992, who dealt 
with the market for taxi-cab licences). 
Models Dynamic choice models with increasing information use a Bayesian learning process 
where the IV is the additional utility resulting from improved information about the state of 
nature that is to occur (see the seminal analysis of Marschak and Radner, 1972). Experimental 
studies that deal with individual information valuation are rare (Rauchs and Willinger, 1996) 
compared to dynamic choice studies, especially ones dealing with temporal inconsistency and 
myopic behavior (Anderhub et al., 1996). Our purpose is to use an experimental method to 
observe IV in dynamic choice settings by focusing on sequential transport choice in a context 
of increasing information. In forming their plans, transport users can be regarded as making 
                                                
1 We use dynamic choice as sequential choice according to the dynamic choice theory (Strotz, 1955-1956; Marschak and Radner, 1972). 
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sequential choices: to get to their destination point, they first choose a mode and then a 
departure time. In our experiment the amount of information available is increased as the 
player goes through these steps. We are thus able to study individual adaptation. 
More specifically, two kinds of information are offered at different prices: the second message 
is more precise than the first, but is provided later in the sequence of decisions - i.e. when the 
route has already been chosen. In most cases, the individual should be willing to pay more for 
the second message than for the first. 
Two components of our experiment are quite new considering how information learning is 
implemented and how choices are dynamic, especially by comparison with the papers dealing 
with information and road transport cited above. First, decision-making is sequential - i.e. (a) 
the individual is able to reconsider his or her choice as regards information acquisition and (b) 
the level of available information increases as the decision sequence progresses, which 
implies Bayesian process for the individual. Second, the information messages are not free of 
charge. 
Section 2 briefly defines the expected utility of increasing information - i.e. the Information 
Value - and then describes the dynamic transport choice experiment. The third section derives 
the theoretical results stemming from the model. Lastly, the fourth section gives the 
experimental results and compares them with theoretical predictions. 
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2. AN EXPERIMENT TO INVESTIGATE DYNAMIC TRANSPORT CHOICE WITH 
INCREASING INFORMATION 
How much is a decision-maker willing to pay for additional information before he or she 
makes his or her decision? The Information Value (IV)2 is defined as the maximum amount a 
player is willing to pay in order to obtain a given item of information. In more precise terms, 
what is involved is an information partition under expected utility maximizing assumption. 
2.1. Information Value in Expected Utility 
A basic theoretical model of Information Value in Expected Utility describes a two-period 
choice (t = 1, 2) under uncertainty. Let D be the set of possible choices at the beginning of the 
first period ( IiDd i ,...,1;   for t = 1), S the set of states ( s j  the state j, j = 1 to J) and Y a set 
of messages/observations with elements y ( yk  the signal k). By definition, an Information Set 
is the set of different states that the agent is unable to discern3. An Information Partition (IP) 
is therefore a collection of information sets, the information sets being themselves subsets of S 
which are mutually exclusive and for all incompatible. In Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) 
Expected Utility, an IP(A) is more informative than an IP(B) if IP(A) is more detailed than 
IP(B). Moreover, an IP(A) is better than an IP(B) if 
   (.)(.),;)((.)(.),;)( uBIPUuAIPU    
                                                
2 The following definitions are taken from Willinger (1989). For more details about the axioms which underline the Bayesian information 
structure, see Laffont (1991) or Jones and Ostroy (1984). 
3 For instance, if an individual makes an experiment by throwing a dice and announces to an hooded individual that the result is “an even 
number”, this individual is not able to say if the result is “2”, “4” or “6” but knows that “1”, “3”, “5” are impossible states. Then, he or she 
is not able to discern among states “2”, “4”, “6” because the experiment do not enable to discriminate between these three states. The 
information partition associated to this experiment is the union of information sets IP(A)=({1,3,5},{2,4,6}), each set being attached to an 
experiment ({1,2,3} is attached to “the number is uneven”, {2,4,6} is attached to “the number is even”), whereas before throwing the dice, 
the information partition was IP(B)=({1,2,3,4,5,6}). 
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where (.)  is the probability function on S before any message is observed, and u(.) is the 
utility function attached to states s j . 
“Increasing information” means that the agent moves from IP1 (a particular collection of 
subsets of S at t = 1) to IP2 (a collection of subsets of S at t = 2) which is more detailed than 
IP14. For example, if we assume that a driver goes from A to B via the same road every 
morning and that four states of traffic are possible: “very light”, “light”, “medium” and 
“heavy”. These states are all equally probable. Each level gives a certain level of transport cost 
for the driver. Before leaving A, he or she could obtain more information about the traffic 
level, for example by means of a radio-message saying “the traffic between A and B is not 
heavy”. This is one possible message y among other possible messages, and enables the driver 
to revise his or her probabilities. Here, the state “heavy” becomes impossible, and the 
probabilities have changed (now 1/3 per possible traffic state). Thus, three kinds of situation 
have to be considered: 
(i) No information (incomplete IP): the decision-maker is not able to to improve his or her 
information - i.e. is unable to refine his or her information via the set of S and the IP does not 
change over time. The driver receives no more information before leaving A or receives a 
message that is of no use. 
(ii) Perfect information (Perfect IP): the agent goes from IP(A) to IP(B) the later being 
singletons. The agent then combines a signal yk and a state sj - if an agent receives the signal 
yk, he or she knows that state sj will occur in the coming period. In our example, a driver who 
gets a radio message saying “the traffic is heavy” will be able to change his or her departure 
                                                
4 It is possible to say that IP2 is a refinement of IP1 if in IP2, (i) the number of information sets is greater than in IP1 and (ii) if every 
information set belonging to IP2 is a collection of subsets of any information set belonging to IP1. See Rasmusen (1989) for further details. 
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time for instance. He or she knows with certainty that the probability is 1 for “heavy” and 0 
for the other states; 
(iii) Imperfect information (Partial IP): the agent improves his or her information - i.e. refines 
his or her IP, but remains unable to combine any yk with a single sj. For instance, if the radio 
message says “The traffic level is changing from very light to light at the moment”, the driver 
will know that the probability of having medium or heavy traffic is 0, but not know with 
certainty from the message which state will occur. 
The IV is the difference between the expected utility with the more detailed IP and the 
expected utility with the less detailed IP. In VNM expected utility, IV is always positive or 
equal to zero. Obviously, the imperfect information cases are the most interesting, because it 
is unusual for the driver to have perfect knowledge about the states which will occur in the 
coming period. 
 
2.2. A dynamic transport choice experiment with increasing information about traffic 
The experiment deals with a sequential transport choice and observes how transport choices 
change when individuals are offered traffic information which is not free of charge. First, if 
the IV theory is right, subjects should be willing to pay more for the most accurate 
information. Second, subjects should only buy the information in the case where IV - i.e. 
Expected Utility with the information minus Expected Utility without information - exceeds 
the information price. 
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(a) Design5 
In the experiment6, 3 groups of 10 subjects7 play 10 rounds. During each round, each of the 
subjects plans their travel from point A to point B. The arrival time *t at B is constrained 
(fixed at 5 pm)8. In each round, players are first informed about road capacities. In this 
experiment the capacity is the number of players who can take a given route without incurring 
congestion (L = 1 means that if 2 or more players choose L the travel time on L will increase). 
First, players choose their transport mode – either Train (T) or Road (R). If they choose T, they 
are sure of getting B at 5 pm. All players have the opportunity to purchase information about 
traffic level on R, RI  giving nR, the actual number of players who has chosen R. All the 
players know the price of this information, which is different for each round. They can either 
purchase RI  or refuse to do so. The players are unaware of whether the others have purchased 
RI . 
Players who choose R will then select their route – either a Local road route (L) or a free 
Highway (H). The capacity on L route is always lower than on H route. All players have the 
opportunity to purchase information about the actual traffic on H ( HI  gives nH) and the price 
is different during each round. The players do not know who has purchased the information. 
At the end of each round, the players have to choose their departure time dt  from among a set 
of possible departure times. The amount paid to each player depends both on his arrival time 
                                                
5 The design of the experiment stems from a discussion with Professor Werner Güth, who suggested a design to investigate transport choice. 
His initial idea has only been implemented in part, the emphasis being placed on information value. 
6 Full instructions are available from the authors on request. 
7 Students taking economics and the management courses. There is no difference between the 3 groups. 
8 The paper does not directly deal with the morning commute problem. We do not refer explicitly to the morning rush in such a way that in 
the experiment the subjects only concentrate on the information impact on their own modal and time decision in front of a constraint arrival 
time whenever during the day. 
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at , which may differ from the constrained arrival time 
*t , and on his or her travel time t . The 
travel time t  is a function of the traffic level on each route - i.e. the number of players who 
have chosen L or H. In the experiment, the travel time without congestion is 40 minutes on 
route L and 30 minutes on route H. The travel times with congestion are shown in the table of 
payments given to the players. 
Each player’s monetary endowment for the first round is 60 ECUs (1 ECU for 1 FF or 
6.55957 €). The endowment for each of the following rounds is the sum of the player’s 
payments for the previous rounds added to the initial endowment. Any communication 
between players is forbidden during the experiment. 
 
(b) The payoff function 
The payoff function is based on a transport cost function (Vickrey, 1969). It takes into account 
both the cost of the journey time and the cost of the difference between the actual and target 
arrival times. Such a function is widely used in transport economics, in the context of both 
analytical studies and experimental work. 
For any departure time dt , in the event of early arrival   a dt t t * , the total travel cost is 
       ttttttC dadd  *  (1) 
where   is the cost of a unit of transport time and   is the cost per time unit of being early. 
For any dt , in the event of late arrival   a dt t t * , the total travel cost is 
       ttttttC dadd *   (2) 
where   is the cost per time unit of being late. 
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The maximum gain G is fixed. If  tCArg dmin  is the lowest possible travel cost for all 
departure time dt , the payoff function is 
  
   
2
min tCtCArg
=G+tP
dd
d

. (3) 
The payoff for choice T is 1 ECU. 
In the experiment9, G = 20 ECUs,  1 ECU,   2  ECUs,   3  ECUs. We have also 
implemented a bonus of 20 ECUs in the case of *tta  . 
To illustrate, let us fix the constrained arrival time t
*  at 17:00. Assume the player’s chosen 
route is L  and the player’s chosen departure time t d  is 16:15 and that in view of congestion 
the actual arrival time  tt da  is 17:15 in the case where 1L , 2H  and 10nL . The 
minimum among all possible costs is always 30 (in the case of a choice H  with low traffic 
levels on H  (1 or 2 users), and a 16:30 departure time choice). Then, if the player has chosen 
L  and nL  being equal to 10, then his or her travel time is 60 minutes and his or her travel cost 
is 60 ECUs (60 minutes *1 ECU). Moreover, he or she has chosen 16:15 as a departure time, 
and then he or she arrived at B  60 minutes later – i.e. at 17:15, being late for 15 minutes. His 
or her schedule delay cost is then equal to 15 minutes * 3 ECUs = 45 ECUs. His or her total 
travel time cost is then 60 ECUs + 45 ECUs = 105 ECUs. The corresponding payoff is equal 
to 20 + (30-105)/2 = -17.5 ECUs (see the Tables of payoffs used in the experiment in 
Appendix A). 
 
                                                
9 The values taken for the cost of travel time and schedule delay are not typical of those found in the standard literature (Arnott et al., 1990). 
However, in our experiment, the idea was to give a high value for schedule delay cost in order to encourage players to make an intelligent 
choice of departure time. 
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3. THEORETICAL RESULTS AND MODEL 
3.1. Basic assumptions 
The main assumption is that individuals are Expected Utility maximizers. Thus, when 
individuals receive perfect information about traffic levels they choose the departure time that 
maximizes the payment. Moreover, the IVs are determined with respect to the payoff function. 
We assume, as do most experimenters in decision-making games, that this payoff function 
represents the utility function of any player, and that all players are risk-neutral – i.e. that 
expected utility is equivalent to expected payoff. Information Value is in this case equivalent 
to the gain in expected payoff enabled by increasing information. We have assumed, however, 
that we could use an uniform probability function. Note that the model implemented here 
differs from classical discrete choice models (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) in that we have 
assumed that neither the decision rules nor the utility function are probabilistic. The utility 
function is assumed to be known and the choice process is deterministic. Only the traffic 
levels are uncertain. 
In the experimental design, all the subjects know they are playing against the (n-1) other 
subjects in the group, and this knowledge affects their choice. Then, if the experiment 
implements a game situation, why not use game theory tools in order to determine the 
equilibrium instead of decision theory? There seems to be no reason that decision theory does 
not apply to decision-making in game theory situations, as has been pointed out by Broome 
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(1990). This author describes the traditional “twin prisoners' dilemma”10 (i.e. situations where 
the players are entirely self-interested, but think very much alike), where “you and your twin 
can act nice or nasty”. Acting nasty is a dominant strategy, so both players will choose it. 
What would be the outcome if decision theory were used? Broome says (1990, p. 487): 
“Faced with the twin prisoners dilemma, a follower of Savage has two alternatives. She may 
decline to apply the theory at all, perhaps taking the general view that decision theory does not 
apply to games. Or she may pick some things to serve as states of nature. She may, for 
instance, take your twin's acts as states of nature from your point of view. They will then have 
to be assigned probabilities independent of your own acts. And whatever probabilities they are 
assigned, acting nasty will come out with a higher expected utility for you”. 
Broome then goes on to argue that in numerous game situations, using decision theory could 
give the same result as game theory. For example, in Public Good Games, the best theoretical 
solution is not to contribute. There is no doubt that in many of the experimental settings 
associated with such games, the best choice according to expected utility theory is also not to 
contribute. We have assumed here that the best choice given by decision theory is the same as 
that given by game theory. 
So, for routes H and L, the individual will have to choose the departure time td. We have 
assumed that the driver will choose the best td for route L or route H if he or she have received 
                                                
10 Two people are arrested for the same crime. The police lack evidence to convict either suspect and consequently need 
them to give testimony against each other. They are placed in separate rooms and given the opportunity to confess. If only 
one of them confesses, he or she serves one year and the other receives a ten-year sentence. If both confess, they each serve 
five-year terms. If neither confesses, each receives a maximum two-year penalty. Thus, both would be better off if neither 
confesses, but each, aware of each other’s incentives to confess in any case, will probably confess. This game, called a 
“coordination game” by game theorists, demonstrates the failure of spontaneous coordination between non-cooperative 
players, according to the Pareto-optimality criterion. 
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perfect information about the traffic level on the route. The information alternatives available 
to the individual are: “purchase no information” or, “purchase RI  giving nR” or, “purchase 
HI  giving nH” or, “purchase both RI  and HI ”. It might be thought that the last case need not 
be considered, but it may be of value to purchase HI  if the individual has already purchased 
RI  (for example, individuals who have purchased RI  and choose R would get perfect 
information with HI ). 
 
3.2. Expected gains and information value 
We have to calculate how the expected gains are increased if the individuals purchase RI  or 
HI , or RI  and HI . We shall first of all compute the expected gains without any information 
purchase. 
 
(a) The expected gains without any information 
The expected gains without any information are as follows : 
 1)( TE  (4) 
  E R Max E L E H( ) ( ); ( )  (5) 
with 
  E L Max e itd( )   ;  
itde td
nL x U i
x
 

 ( )
1
10
; (6) 
  E H Max itde( ) '  ;  itde tdnH y U iy' ( ) ' 1
10
 (7) 
where: 
itd  is the departure time i for choice L (i = 1 to 5); 
itd '  is the departure time i’ for choice H (i’ = 1 to 9); 
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)(
i
tdU  is the utility attached to itd  at each traffic level for L - i.e. the payoff defined in (3); 
)(
'i
tdU  is the utility attached to 'td i  at each traffic level for H; 
  nL x  is the probability of the number of players on L (nL) being equal to x (the traffic 
level on L is x); 
  nH y  is the probability of the number of players on H (nH) being equal to y. 
Let us now explain equations (5), (6) and (7). In equation (6), a player who chooses L can 
choose a departure time of 16:00. The expected utility of this departure time given his or her 
choice L is then the expected payoff of a 16:00 departure time choice. This is the probability 
of x of players choosing L multiplied by the payoff for every possible level of traffic. Here, the 
possible states for traffic are nL = 1,…,10 therefore 1.0)(  xnL . Equation (7) gives the 
expected utility – in the experiment, the expected payoff – for the choice H. Finally, equation 
(5) means that, if the player is an expected utility maximizer, he or she should choose between 
L or H by comparing the values he or she expects. 
Given the payoff structure, a player who has chosen R has to choose between L and H before 
choosing a departure time. The payoff of L or H will then depend upon the departure time. For 
instance, in one of our experiments (where the capacity of L was 2 and the capacity of H was 
4), the expected payoff of a 16:00 departure time on L was +13.75, -0.75 for 16:05, etc. 
(expected payoff declines with a later departure time). A rational player should choose 16:00 
if L has been chosen so, the expected payoff for L is +13.75. For H, the expected payoff is 
given by the best choice from among the possible departure times on that route. For example, 
the highest expected payoff on H in this case was –7 ECUs with a departure time of 16:00 on 
H. So, a rational player having chosen mode R should choose route L and a departure time of 
16:00, because, without any information, this is the best choice with regard to the expected 
payoff. 
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(b) The expected gains with IH – The Information Value for IH 
The expected gains with IH are as follows : 
 nH y ; y  0 10,...,  nL x ;   yx  10,0 , 
  )();()( ynHIHEynHILEMaxynHIRE HHH   (8) 
where I H  gives the number of players y who have chosen H (nH) and 
      



10
0
y
y
HH ynHIREynHIRE   (9) 
and the IV for I H  is 
     0)(  REIREIIV HH . (10) 
 
(c) The expected gains with IR – The Information Value of IR 
The expected gains with IR are as follows : 
  nR z  ; ( z  0 10,..., ):  )();()( znRIHEznRILEMaxznRIRE RRR   (11) 
so 
      



10
1
z
z
HR znRIREznRIRE   (12) 
and the IV for I R  is 
     0)(  REIREIIV RR . (13) 
 
(d) The expected gains with IR and IH – The Information Value of IR and IH 
It is obvious that the IV of both pieces of information about traffic levels is different from the 
sum of the IVs (      IIVIIVIandIIV HRHR  ). A player who has information about R can 
infer which states of nH and nR are not possible. Purchasing HI  will then give him or her 
 L. Denant-Boèmont, R. Petiot 17 
 
perfect information about the state of nature for R and H. When buying RI , the player has to 
choose between L and H. This choice is made by considering the possible states for nH and 
the probabilities of these states given the state of nR. For any nH, the player makes the best 
decision (L or H). So, for a given value of nR = z 
         tdUtdUMaxznRynHznRIandIREznR ii
zy
y
HR '
0
;


   (14) 
      



10
1
z
z
HRHR znRIandIREznRIandIRE  . (15) 
Finally, 
     0)(  REIandIREIandIIV HRHR . (16) 
Because having RI  and HI  is equivalent to a perfect Information Set, we should have 
 )()()( IIVIIVIandIIV RHHR   (17) 
 
3.3. Theoretical results 
On the basis of the payoff function, the expected gains and IVs are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Information Values for IR, IH, « IR and IH » (ECUs) 
Capacity 
Expected Gain 
L=2 ; H=4 L=1 ; H=2  Capacity 
Information Value 
L=2 ; H=4 L=1 ; H=2 
 E R  +13.75 +16.75     
 E R RI  +25.9 +19.7  IV RI( )  +12.1 +2.9 
 E R HI  +28.5 +20.9  IV HI( )  +14.8 +4.1 
 E R andR HI I  +34.1 +31  IV andR HI I( )  +20.4 +14.2 
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It may be helpful to examine, for example,  E R andR HI I  in the case where  4 , 2  HL . 
Here, the player receives information about the traffic on mode R (if he or she buys it!) and 
then chooses between routes L and H. The player then gets further information about the 
traffic on route H (if he or she buys it) before choosing a departure time. In this case, the 
player is in a “perfect information” state (if there are 5 R choices there are 5 T choices and if 
there are 3 H choices there are 2 L choices) - i.e. the player knows at the beginning of the 
game that he or she will be able to know the state of traffic with certainty, but also that for the 
time being no information is available to make the first choice between mode T and mode R. 
Therefore, to use the terminology of game theory, the player has to use backward induction to 
assess his or her best choice at the beginning of the game. At this moment, each state of traffic 
on R is equally probable and the player has to assess each possibility. For example, let us 
assume that there is 1 R (the probability is 10%). There are then two possible states for the 
traffic on L and H: either the traffic on L is in state “1”, in which case the traffic on H is in 
state “0”, or the traffic on L is in state “0” and the traffic on H is in state “1”. More generally, 
if the traffic level on R is x, there are (x+1) possible states for the distribution of this traffic 
between L and H, each state being equally probable. For each possible state, the payoff of an R 
choice is the maximum from among the payoffs for L and the payoffs for H. For instance, if 
nR=2, there are 3 possible states: 
1. H=0 and L=2 (probability equal to 1/3 given a 10% probability that nR=2): this implies 
that the player on R has chosen L and will receive 35 ECUs (the payoff on L given the best 
departure time); 
2. H=1 and L=1 (probability equal to 1/3): a player who chooses H will get 40 ECUs and a 
player who chooses L will get 35 ECUs. Given the state, the best choice is H; 
3. H=2 and L=0: this implies that the player on R has chosen H and will get 40 ECUs. 
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Then, in the case where nR=2, the expected payoff is       38.3401/3401/3351/3  . 
This expected payoff has to be multiplied by 0.1 to obtain the expected payoff for the state 
R=2 that is to say +3.83. This kind of calculation has to be performed for each possible state 
of R and at the end the expected payoff of  IandIR HR  is the sum of 34.13.83   ECUs. 
A rational player (an expected utility maximizing individual) should perform this process for 
each possible state in order to assess the expected payoff of the R choice with these two levels 
of information and to assess the R choice in a bayesian manner. Given all the possible 
messages (i.e. all the possible levels of traffic) and the payoffs attached to each state for each 
possible choice, the player has to compare the expected value of R without any kind of 
information (in the example +13.75) with the expected value of R in a “perfect information” 
state (in our example, the expected payoff of R in a “perfect information” state is +34.1). 
Not surprisingly, the first thing we find is that the expected utility of choice R increases as 
additional information is provided to individuals, i.e. that IVs are strictly positive. Secondly, 
the IV of HI  is higher than the IV of RI . We cannot say that this result is linked to the fact 
that the information HI  is “perfect” compared to RI , which is imperfect. Although HI  
amounts to perfect information when the player has chosen H, this is not true when the player 
has chosen L. So, HI  is obviously a refinement of RI , but it is not equivalent to perfect 
information: both RI  and HI  are “imperfect” information. This explains the small difference 
between IVs which is confirmed by the large difference between the IV of ( RI  and HI ) and 
IV( HI ), IV( RI ), because both messages are equivalent to a complete IP for any choice R. 
It should also be noted that the IVs for any kind of information are greater when the capacities 
of roads L and H are high than when the capacities are low, which could seem paradoxical. 
However, what occurs is that the uncertainty about payments grows as the capacities of both 
roads increase (the relative capacities of H and L are constant in our experiment), as do the 
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IVs. The level of IV is mainly linked to the dispersion of the results in the different states. 
Another explanation relates to the characteristics of the payoff function, which favors an early 
departure time. 
The data in Table 2 enable us to build the different scenarios for the experiment, i.e. the prices 
for information RI  and HI  for given infrastructure capacities, which give an information 
price that is over or under the IV. The aim is to observe different information purchase 
possibilities for any kind of information in the two differing capacity scenarios. 
 
Table 2 
Price levels (ECUs) for IR and IH and theoretical predictions 
Capacities Round p
I R
 pI H
 Information which should have been purchased 
 1 14 4 
HI  or ( RI and HI ) 
L = 2 2 6 16 RI  
 5 14 10 HI  
H = 4 8 2 16 (
RI and HI ) or RI  
 9 15 15 none 
 3 1 6 (
RI and HI ) or RI  
L = 1 4 1 3 (
RI and HI ) or RI  or HI  
 6 13 3 HI  
H = 2 7 1 15 RI  
 10 6 12 none 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive results 
Mode R was chosen 295 times and mode T only 5 times (see Fig. 1), which is explained by the 
low level of payment for choice T. Route L was chosen 206 times (69.8%) and route H 89 
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times (30.2%). Choice L was dominant within each of the 9 rounds, but the level of this 
domination varied from one round to another. 
 
Fig. 1. Aggregated modal and route choices 
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The choice of departure time should depend on the possible travel time on each route, with 
reference to the traffic level and capacities. A departure time of before 16:20 for L or before 
16:30 for H is considered to be an early departure. Experimental outcomes are given in Figure 
2. It shows the share of the chosen departure times for L and H for each round. First, choice L 
requires an earlier departure time (16:00 for about 90% of the choices L) than choice H 
because the payoff function means that H is the riskier choice (the expected gain is lower 
while the variance is higher). The individuals choosing H therefore are adopting a risky 
strategy (more than 50% of the players choose 16:30 which maximizes the payment if there is 
no congestion). Some other players are risk averse and play H with an early departure time 
(16:00 or 16:20). In this case, the dispersion around the departure time is higher for the H 
choice. The second explanation is that the information about traffic on route H plays a greater 
part in the choice of H than it does in the choice of L: when the individual receives HI , he or 
she chooses the best answer, which could be quite different from the choices made by 
individuals without HI . The behavior of the groups is practically similar and explains 37.7% 
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of the variance for choice L and 23.1% of the variance for choice H. Therefore, a “group 
effect” is not sufficient to explain the variability of the choices between L and H. 
 
Fig. 2. Departure time frequencies for L and H 
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There is no bar chart for the choice H for the group B because no player have chosen the route H. 
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Is this variability explained by the difference in route capacities? The global preference for 
choice L is again observed in both capacity situations (see Fig. 3). It is obvious that choice H 
is more frequent when the capacity of the route H is the largest, but choice L seems to be 
preferred when all the rounds are considered. 
 
Fig. 3. Aggregated Route choices and Route capacities 
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Perhaps the choices made by players can be explained by some of the characteristics of 
payments. The dispersion of payments as a result of choice H deters more players from 
choosing H than the dispersion of payments as a result of choice L. Let us assume that players 
first try the route which allows them to improve their initial monetary endowment. They are 
then in a position where they can take the risk of choosing route H (Rounds 5 and 6) as they 
have enough money to do so. Some of them lose money as a result of choosing route H and 
return to route L (Rounds 7, 8, 9, 10). Risk aversion analysis might shed some light on this 
situation, but we shall not attempt this here. 
So, a certain “capacity effect” would seem necessary to explain some of the variability that 
affects route choices during the rounds. Nevertheless, this capacity effect seems to be closely 
linked to the payment structure for both routes. Clearly, choices should be explained from the 
point of view of information purchase. 
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The players more often purchased information about the traffic level on H than on R, 139 
times versus 78 times respectively (see Fig. 4). Furthermore, information purchase behavior 
changed in different rounds. Most players purchased messages in the early rounds ( I R  and/or 
HI ). Towards the end a small number of players bought message. Players who still purchased 
information preferred to by HI . 
 
Fig. 4. Aggregated information purchase per round 
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An initial hypothesis we can make is that the price of information influences the amount 
bought. However, there is no clear cut relationship between price and information demand. 
The elasticity of HI  purchase with respect to information price is -0.7 whereas the elasticity 
of RI  purchase is –0.26. If these results are not conclusive enough concerning the price 
impact on the information purchase, HI  purchase seems yet more sensitive than RI  purchase. 
The players appraisal leading to buy HI  with respect to its price seems more accurate than it 
is for RI . Perhaps this is explained by the fact that RI  is offered at the beginning of the round, 
whereas HI  is sold at the end of the round and may thus be more beneficial to the subject. It 
seems possible that information purchase may depend on the chosen route. 
Most of the players who choose L begin to purchase information in the 6 first rounds, but 
most of them do not purchase any information in the 2 last rounds (94% for the round 9 and 
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96% for the round 10). According to the RI  elasticity, the RI  purchase cannot be explained 
by the RI  price, but it seems clear that RI  becomes less and less interesting as rounds go 
along. On the contrary, most of those who choose H purchase HI  (more than 57% in the 
experiment) (see Fig. 5). Nevertheless, the variation in the purchasing behavior of those 
choosing H seems to be erratic. According to the HI  elasticity, it seems obvious that this 
purchasing behavior cannot be explained without exploring the IV; this is considered below. 
 
Fig. 5. Aggregated route choices and Information purchase per round 
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4.2. A comparison between theoretical results and observations 
(a) Information Value in comparison to its price 
An individual’s behavior can be predicted from route capacities. If the IV is higher than its 
price, the player should buy it. The aim of the experiment is to test whether individuals buy 
information when and only when its value exceeds its price. The statistical test has to show 
whether individual demand for information is greater in the rounds where the IV is higher 
than its price than in the rounds where the IV is lower than its price. We have thus carried out 
a “within subject” comparison test for non-independent data. We have chosen a nonparametric 
test (the Wilcoxon test) for which the null hypothesis is: 
H0: the information demand in the set of rounds where the player should not have bought the 
information is not significantly different from the demand in the set of rounds where the 
player should have bought it, versus H1: the demand for information is higher in the set of 
rounds where the information should be bought than in the set of rounds where the 
information should not be bought. 
Because of the respective levels of price and IV (see Tables 1 and 2), HI  should not have 
been bought in rounds 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10, but should have been bought in rounds 1, 4, 5 and 
6. The test was made for each group of 10 players (A, B and C). 
 
Table 3 
Actual information purchasing behaviors 
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Actual number of buying RI  8 16 20 12 1 0 10 8 1 2 
Actual number of buying HI  19 13 17 21 17 24 4 10 9 5 
Actual number of buying RI  and HI  6 7 14 10 1 0 3 4 1 1 
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In Table 4, the second column (positive ranks) shows the number of players who bought more 
information in the rounds where it was profitable to do so than in the rounds where it was not. 
The third column (negative ranks) shows the number of players who bought more information 
in the rounds where it was not worth buying than in the rounds where it was worthwhile. The 
fourth column shows the number of players who were not sensitive to information price and 
whose demand for information did not differ between the rounds where information purchase 
was worthwhile and the rounds where purchase it was not. The fifth column shows the level 
of statistical significance (the asterisk indicates that H0 should not be accepted for   5%). 
Except for the purchase of HI  by group A, it is difficult to accept H0, i.e. the individuals have 
bought more information when it was worth more than its price. The results favor H1 even 
more strongly. 
 
Table 4 
Wilcoxon Test 
Test for IH 
Group (+) ranks (-) ranks number of discarded results Critical 
probability 
A 7 1 2 0.098 
B 9 1 0 0.002* 
C 9 1 0 0.003* 
 Test for IR 
Group (+) ranks (-) ranks number of discarded results Critical 
probability 
A 8 0 2 0.004* 
B 10 0 0 0.001* 
C 8 0 2 0.004* 
 Test for IR and IH 
Group (+) ranks (-) ranks number of discarded results Critical 
probability 
A 5 1 4 0.031* 
B 8 2 0 0.008* 
C 6 1 3 0.019* 
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(b) Demand for IH compared to Demand for IR 
Another idea is to test the hierarchy between RI  and HI , because information about nH 
would seem, judging from its IV, to be the most interesting. We have therefore performed a 
“within subject” Wilcoxon test where the nul hypothesis is: 
H0: the individual demand for RI  is not significantly higher than for HI , 
H1: the individual demand for HI  is significantly higher than for RI  
The results show that it is difficult to accept H0: the individuals considered that HI  was more 
useful that RI  and bought it significantly more frequently. 
 
Table 5 
Wilcoxon Test about individual demand on IR compared to IH 
Group (+) ranks (-) ranks number of discarded results Critical 
probability 
A 6 2 3 0.039* 
B 8 1 1 0.008* 
C 8 1 1 0.006* 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our most important findings are as follows: 
(a) In a context of increasing information where information is not free of charge, players 
compare the utility of information to its cost and this calculation is an important part of the 
comparison between risk with regard to travel time and monetary travel cost, 
(b) The dynamic choice model seems to provide a reasonable approximation of individual 
valuation. In particular, the willingness to pay (WTP) for more detailed information is higher 
than for less detailed information. This still applies even when the less detailed information is 
available before the more detailed information. 
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(c) Players choose to buy information when the variance in payoffs for the route choice is 
sufficiently high. This confirms the theoretical result obtained by Emmerink et al. (1998). 
(d) The types of choices individuals make change over time. At the beginning of the 
experiment many players explore the environment by making risky choices and by buying 
information. Gradually, their strategy changes and most individuals choose a less risky mode 
without information purchase. This illustrates the way in which individual learning substitutes 
for exogenous information provided by the experimenter. 
Our findings show that, in a transport context, players presented with real-time information 
tend to be rational in their modal and route choice behavior. Moreover, information matters 
for players, in the sense that behavioral responses could be significant in an evolving 
environment. Finally, the experiment also shows that it is important to recognize the diversity 
of users when faced with information provision, and to discriminate between experienced and 
inexperienced users. It confirms the findings of Dudek and Huchingson (1982) that 
inexperienced drivers are more likely to change their route in response to a message than 
experienced drivers. It should therefore be possible to avoid the decrease in the effectiveness 
of information that may occur when too many users are informed about traffic levels. 
One of the first questions we can ask about this kind of transport-related experimental game is 
whether the results can be transferred to real-life departure time tradeoffs. The problem is that 
we are dealing with players and not real users; real life can never be exactly produced in the 
laboratory and subjects are always liable to behave differently. In real world, we are aware that 
users do not behave rationally as we assume here. Therefore, further developments should 
consider bounded rationality theory. This applies yet to any work in the field of experimental 
economics, because the primary aim of a researcher is to perform a normative study by 
designing an experiment to investigate a single effect. However, our exploratory experiment 
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can be considered to be quite adequate in order to explain the potential impact of traffic 
information for driving with a limited number of modes and a limited number of routes. 
Finally, we consider that this paper makes a contribution to the application of experimental 
economics as a rigorous data production method to test theoretical models in the field of 
transport behavior analysis. 
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Appendix A 
Tables of payoffs 
 
Table 6 
Tables of payoffs L=1 
L=1  Payoffs according to time departure 
(ECUs) 
Traffic 
(actual number of persons 
who have chosen L) 
Travel time 
(minutes) 
 
16:00 
 
16:05 
 
16:10 
 
16:15 
 
16:20 
1 40 -5 0 5 10 35 
2 45 -2,5 2,5 7,5 32,5 5 
3 50 0 5 30 2,5 -5 
4 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
5 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
6 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
7 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
8 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
9 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
10 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
 
Table 7 
Tables of payoffs L=2 
L=2  Payoffs according to time departure 
(ECUs) 
Traffic 
(actual number of persons 
who have chosen L) 
Travel time 
(minutes) 
 
16:00 
 
16:05 
 
16:10 
 
16:15 
 
16:20 
1 40 -5 0 5 10 35 
2 40 -5 0 5 10 35 
3 45 -2,5 2,5 7,5 32,5 5 
4 50 0 5 30 2,5 -5 
5 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
6 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
7 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
8 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
9 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
10 60 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 
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Table 8 
Tables of payoffs H=2 
H=2  Payoffs according to time departure 
(ECUs) 
Traffic 
(actual number 
of persons who 
have chosen H) 
Travel time 
(minutes) 
 
15:50 
 
15:55 
 
16:00 
 
16:05 
 
16:10 
 
16:15 
 
16:20 
 
16:25 
 
16:30 
1 30 -60 -55 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 40 
2 30 -60 -55 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 40 
3 40 -55 -50 -5 0 5 10 35 7,5 0 
4 60 -45 -40 25 -2,5 -10 -17,5 -25 -32,5 -40 
5 65 -42,5 -17,5 -5 -12,5 -20 -27,5 -35 -42,5 -50 
6 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -30 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
7 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -30 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
8 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -30 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
9 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -30 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
10 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -30 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
 
Table 9 
Tables of payoffs H=4 
H=4  Payoffs according to time departure 
(ECUs) 
Traffic 
(actual number 
of persons who 
have chosen H) 
Travel time 
(minutes) 
 
15:50 
 
15:55 
 
16:00 
 
16:05 
 
16:10 
 
16:15 
 
16:20 
 
16:25 
 
16:30 
1 30 -60 -55 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 40 
2 30 -60 -55 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 40 
3 30 -60 -55 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 40 
4 30 -60 -55 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 40 
5 40 -55 -50 -5 0 5 10 35 7,5 0 
6 60 -45 -40 25 -2,5 10 -17,5 -25 -32,5 -40 
7 65 -42,5 -17,5 -5 -12,5 -17,5 -27,5 -35 -42,5 -50 
8 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -27,5 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
9 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -27,5 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
10 70 -20 -47,5 -15 -22,5 -27,5 -37,5 -45 -52,5 -60 
 
